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Peter MacKinnon* Labour Relations in the Academy
A Case Study at the University of
Saskatchewan
In the wake of a protracted period of faculty unrest at the University of
Saskatchewan, two decisions of the province's Labour Relations Board1',
and an award of a sole arbitrator 3 will have more enduring significance
than the dispute that engendered them. In this paper I propose to consider
this trilogy and comment on its importance in an assessment of labour
relations in an academic setting.
L The Background
It was in a troubled economic climate that University administrators and
faculty representatives sat down in June of 1987 to begin negotiations for
a new collective agreement to be in effect from July 1st of that year. The
announcement three months earlier by the province's Minister of Finance
of a two-year wage freeze for public sector employees signalled little or
no increase in the University's operating budget, and the stated
expectations of the two parties were far apart. The Faculty Association
sought terms on salaries and benefits that were estimated to represent an
11 percent cost increase, while the administration was prepared only to
continue the incremental and merit pay structure which, without changes
to salary scales, represented a two percent increase in costs.
Nine bargaining sessions between June, 1987 and February, 1988 did
not close this gap between the parties, and with the end of the academic
year in sight, the Faculty Association moved quickly to take job action.
Study sessions were held on March 17 and 21, and a vote was taken on
a ballot calling for strike action up to and including a full withdrawal of
services."Immediately following the counting of 424 votes in favour and
412 votes opposed, the Faculty Association announced it had opted for
*Peter MacKinnon is Dean and Professor of Law in the College of Law at the University of
Saskatchewan. He is a former chairperson of the university's faculty association and served on
its grievance committee until his appointment to an out-of-scope position in January, 1988.
Those who assisted me in the preparation of this paper might prefer to remain anonymous.
I am happy to oblige, though I am no less grateful for their kind assistance.
1. The University of Saskatchewan v. The University of Saskatchewan Faculty Association
(Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board, 1989).
2. The University of Saskatchewan Faculty Association v. The University of Saskatchewan
(Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board, 1989).
3. In the Matter of an Arbitraon of a Grievance of JR Miller Between the university of
Saskatchewan Faculty Association and the University of Saskatchewan. Award. 1989.
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the full withdrawal of services and, beginning on March 28, about fifty
percent of its members walked off the job. The strike lasted for two weeks
and was ended by back-to-work legislation 4 one day before final
examinations were scheduled to begin.
The capacity of the Faculty Association at the University of
Saskatchewan to lead its membership to take strike action had been
increased by conditions which could not be addressed through collective
bargaining, but which nonetheless could influence its success or failure.
Faculty morale had been undermined by the impact of years of financial
restraint on academic programs as well as on their paycheques, and an
outdated governance apparatus5 deprived the University of an academic
forum in which to address matters of concern to the institution as a
whole. The only organized voice on campus for the expression of faculty
concerns and frustrations was the Faculty Association, and its strategy
was to attribute responsibility for the university's plight solely to its
collective bargaining counterpart - an administration it denounced as
incompetent if not malevolent.6
But there was another condition necessary for the strike. The disrepair
of the University's governance structure did not deprive only the faculty
of a collegial forum in which to address their concerns. It deprived the
administration of the same thing. The University's Council was a body
more suitable for mischief than it was for deliberation and debate,7 and
yet senior officers in the institution did not seek, let alone find, a
substitute for it. This failure of the administration to communicate
effectively with its faculty meant that there was no broadly based,
informed discussion within the academic community of the difficulties
facing the university. Meetings of the Faculty Association membership
resembled pep rallys for job action more than they did informed debate
on the institution's difficulties. And when the administration was
reluctant even to take timely and public issue with the Faculty
Association attack - including misrepresentations that could have been
4. S. S. 1988-89, c. U-7.1.
5. The problems are documented in a report of a university working group. See Governing the
University of Saskatchewan: Tentative Proposal for Change (1987), amended and released as
a final report on Governance by the University's Issues and Options task force in March, 1990.
6. The consequence of this strategy was that "the political repercussions (of the dispute) were
internalized within the university" and the government escaped blame for the chronic
underfunding of higher education. See B. Fairburn, "Post-Secondary Trauma: Higher
Education in Saskatchewan, 1982-89" in Biggs and Stobbe, eds., Devine Rule in Saskatchewan
(1991), at p. 22 9.
7. Ibid It was described by the working group as governance by mass meetings (all of the
more than 1,000 full time faculty are included as members). One of the disadvantages is that
"participation is erratic. It depends on the agenda or ... on whose ox is being gored." (p. 8).
Labour Relations in the Academy
rebutted with ease 8 - it unwittingly strengthened the support for strike
action.
Legislation ended the work stoppage but it did not end the dispute. On
April 8, the last day of the strike, picket lines came down as striking
members of the Faculty Association (all of whom were also members of
the University Council) went to the Council meeting scheduled for that
day to support the motion of one member calling for the dismissal of the
University's President and three Vice-Presidents.9 Mediation, concilia-
tion, renewed and failed negotiations, informal talks between the parties'
lawyers, and a second round of mediation ensued over the next seventeen
months. By the end of this period, there did not exist a closed agenda of
issues to be addressed let alone any prospect that the two parties could
reach an agreement. Finally, with the bargaining relationship in
shambles, and after a second round of mediation, the parties accepted the
mediator's proposals for a four year contract.10 By the time the new
agreement was signed, it had less than a year and a half to run.
II. The Litigatiow The Matter of Salary
For students of labour relations there is much of interest in the dispute at
the University of Saskatchewan. The most obvious and immediate
questions are of local concern, and have to do with the breakdown of the
bargaining relationship in that setting. Of wider importance are matters
arising from the dispute that were submitted to arbitration or taken to the
province's Labour Relation Board. Included in these was the issue of
payment for work performed during the strike.
In the summer of 1988 the Faculty Association filed 306 grievances
relating to the issue of withholding pay for the period of the strike. It is
not surprising that this was a sensitive issue. No more than half of the
University's faculty had joined the work stoppage and the Faculty
Association was not constitutionally empowered to discipline members
who did not participate. In addition, Association leaders apparently had
8. Perhaps the most persistent and damaging misrepresentation was that the administration
had amassed a ten million dollar surplus from funds that should have been available for salary
increases. The two authors who have written on the strike to date agree that the claim was
false. See B. Fairbaim, "The Prof Motive: Radical Conservatism at the University of
Saskatchewan," NuWest Review 14, 1 (Oct-Nov 1988) 20-23, at p. 21. See also J. Sutherland,
"The Final Cheapening," Saskatchewan Report (June, 1988) pp. 12-16 at pp. 15,16.
9. This tumultuous meeting was adjourned after notice of motion was given. Three weeks
later, on April 28, the motion was carried by a vote of 274-166.
10. Mediation - report of Howard E. Tennant. August 28, 1989.
11. Naturally it is difficult to be precise here. My statement is based on University estimates
based on payroll records and on information about the impact of the strike on particular
university programs.
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taken the view that salaries could not or would not be withheld in the
event of a strike, or if they were, would be recovered as part of a
settlement or through the grievance process, and they encouraged their
membership to share this opinion. 12
The first of the grievances to be heard alleged a violation of Article 19
of the Collective Agreement 13 in the withholding of salary for the strike
period from the May, 1988 paycheque to history professor J.R. Miller.
Article 19 states that "salaries shall be paid by cheque during the month
they have been earned"'14 and the Faculty Association rested its case on
two principal arguments. The first was that withholding pay from
Professor Miller was an act of discipline and, accordingly, that the onus
was on the University as employer to justify this action. The second was
that pay could not be withheld in May for strike action that occurred in
March and April. 15 This latter argument was unworthy of the
Association; it had requested the administration not to withhold pay in
April' 6 and the University, with some reluctance, agreed to postpone the
deduction until the end of May. 17 The arbitrator ruled that the
Association was estopped from objecting to a delay which it had
requested and which occurred pursuant to an agreement to which it had
been a party.'8
The argument that the withholding of pay for the strike period was
disciplinary in nature requires more attention. The actual claim that this
action represented punishment by the University of the Association or
those of its members who supported it was given short shrift by the
arbitrator.19 He found that it was very clearly the case "that the
12. In the unfair labour practice case relating to the strike pay grievance, the Labour Relations
Board found as a fact that the May/88 tentative agreement was defeated mainly because it "did
not provide for payment of wages to faculty members while they were striking." Supra, note
1, at p. 2. In the second unfair labour practice case, the Board stated "On May 18, 1988,
members of the Association rejected the tentative agreement, largely because it did not provide
for payment of wages to those who participated in the strike.' Supra, note 2, at p. 5.
The conclusion is irresistible. If striking Association members believed they should and
would be paid for the strike period, it could only be because they were encouraged in their
view by the union leadership.
13. 1986-87 Collective Agreement between the University of Saskatchewan and the University
of Saskatchewan Faculty Association
14. ibid, Article 19.
15. Supra, note 3, at pp. 27, 28.
16. See correspondence exchanged between the mediator and Vice-President Rowlatt, and
between the mediator and Professor Larry Stewart, Chief Negotiator and Senior Grievance
Officer for the Faculty Association.
ibid, at pp. 15-17.
17. ibid
18. ibid, at pp. 32, 33.
19. bid, at pp. 22, 23.
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University had intended to implement a no work, no pay policy. '20 Why,
then, would the Association advance a position which, if not frivolous,
was close to it?
The answer may have been that the apparent advantages of winning
on the point were too good to resist. It is trite law that in grievance cases
generally, the onus rests on the grievor to establish his or her case, but in
discipline cases it rests on the employer to make its case with respect to
imposing discipline and the reasonableness of the penalty. If an arbitrator
had ruled that the act of withholding pay for the strike period was
disciplinary in nature, it would have been incumbent on the University to
prove that Professor Miller and each of the remaining grievors had been
participants in the strike. And this - as everyone involved knew - it
could not do. The administration had not monitored the activities of
individual faculty members so as to identify who did or did not
participate in the strike. It planned to withhold salary for the strike period
from all Faculty Association members, leaving it open to those who had
performed their assigned duties to so indicate to their deans and they
would be paid. If the administration had been obliged to prove that
particular members participated in the work stoppage, the result would
have been that no one would have lost salary for the period of the strike.
The final argument advanced by the Association was that by requiring
an employee who sought to be paid to indicate whether he or she had
performed his or her duties, the administration was violating a
prohibition against interrogating employees as to whether they had
exercised rights under The Trade Union AcL21 This argument was said by
the arbitrator to have no merit 22 and it was summarily dismissed.
Finally, the arbitrator ruled, because the salary deductions were not
disciplinary in nature, the onus remained on the grievor Professor Miller
to make his case. Because he did not testify, he had failed to discharge the
onus and he lost his grievance arbitration.23 But it was only one down
with 305 grievances to go - or so it seemed. The administration and the
Faculty Association had been unable to agree on a common approach, or
upon guidelines which could facilitate global settlement. The
administration had proposed a policy arbitration in an attempt to
20. ibid, at p. 23.
21. b d, at p. 26.
22. bMd
23. This does not mean that Professor Miller was not paid. Professor Stewart of the Faculty
Association testified before the Labour Relations Board on April 17, 1989 that Professor Miller
subsequently wrote to his dean to indicate that he had performed all of his assigned duties
during the period of the strike. If university policy was applied, this means that he would have
been paid.
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establish such guidelines for the cases of Professor Miller and the
remaining grievors, but the Association declined. With no apparent
solution other than the prospect of 306 arbitrations, the administration
went before the Labour Relations Board to complain that.the Association
failed to negotiate in good faith for the settlement of the grievances.
The Collective Agreement between the University and the Faculty
Association provides for the existence of a joint employer-Association
grievance committee charged with facilitating a fair and proper
settlement of grievances.24 To achieve this end, the grievance provisions
give wide scope to this committee, with the entitlement of either the
University or the Association to have other persons - including an
aggrieved employee - attend its meetings for the purpose of providing
information relating to grievances.
The Association had brought 306 grievances to this joint committee. It
took the position that it would provide no information to the employer
to facilitate their settlement. Then, when administration representatives
on the committee sought to have individual grievors attend for the
purpose of providing information on their own cases, the Association
announced that it would advise its members not to provide any
information. The Association continued to assert that the act of
withholding pay for the strike was disciplinary in nature, and that the
onus rested on the University to prove that each and every grievor had
participated in the strike. It became clear that until the issue was settled,
the grievances could not seriously be addressed.
The matter came to a head at a meeting of the Joint Grievance
Committee on July 15, 1988. Administration representatives proposed
that the question of onus be submitted as a policy grievance to. an
arbitrator for a ruling as to whether the withholding of pay was
disciplinary in nature. The Association refused, the meeting ended, and
the matter was placed before the Labour Relations Board.
In reply to the University's allegation that it had obstructed the
grievance procedure, the Association raised three defences. First, it
argued that because what was charged was a violation of the Collective
Agreement, it should be heard by an arbitrator and not by- the Board.
Secondly, it stated that its conduct was justified because the
administration's approach to the settlement of the grievance was itself
unlawful, and finally, it claimed to be acting in good faith and on the
advice of lawyers.
The jurisdictional argument rested on the proposition that grievance
and arbitration provisions in a collective bargaining agreement provide
24. Supra note 12, Article 29.
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the exclusive recourse open to the parties to the agreement for its
enforcement.25 The Labour Relations Board rejected the argument on the
basis that what was alleged was not simply a breach of the employment
contract but a violation of a duty imposed by The Trade Union Act to
negotiate in good faith for the settlement of the salary grievances. In
distinguishing between its jurisdiction and that of an arbitrator, the Board
stated:
The essence of the complaint and the nature of the remedies sought are all
important. If the complainant primarily seeks to enforce rights which owe
their existence to The Trade Union Act and which have not or cannot be
altered by private negotiation, then the Labour Relations Board will
assume jurisdiction. If it primarily seeks to enforce rights which owe their
existence to a collective bargaining agreement, then grievance and
arbitration procedures embodied in the agreement itself should provide the
exclusive recourse open to the parties.26
On the merits, the Association's case fared no better. The Board ruled
that "it had no interest in resolving the individual grievances," 27 and
found that "it deliberately clogged the procedure for the resolution of all
employee grievances and disputes as part of a larger strategy designed to
pressure the employer into making a special wage offer for employees
who had participated in the strike."2s With respect to Association claims
that it was merely resisting unlawful attempts by the administration to
interrogate its members, the Board found that individual grievors were
asked only whether they wished to provide any information that might
assist the Joint Grievance Committee in settling their grievances.29 As for
its argument that it was acting on the advice of its lawyers, the
Association failed on the basis that the quality of the advice it received -
from its lawyers or anyone else - "could not alter the duty to negotiate
in good faith for the settlement of the grievances." 30
III. The Litigation The Obligation to Meet
The University had its turn as a defendant as a result of certain
correspondence exchanged between it and the Faculty Association in late
October and early November of 1988. The recent history of negotiations
was not auspicious. Five months earlier a tentative agreement worked out
with the assistance of a mediator was rejected at a general meeting of the
25. Supra, note 1, at p. 12.
26. ibid
27. bid
28. Ibid, at p. 13.
29. !bid
30. bid
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Association "largely because it did not provide for payment of wages to
those who participated in the strike."' 31 The 306 salary grievances began
to accumulate as the parties returned to the table for the first of what
would be nine bargaining sessions from May to October. During this
time the Association "resisted narrowing the outstanding issues,"'32 and
the University pleaded that it could not go beyond the total cost of the
tentative agreement that already had been turned down by the
Association's membership in May. On October 26 the administration
presented its 'best proposal' for a restructured settlement and indicated a
willingness to meet to discuss it or any other restructured proposal that
did not exceed the projected cost of the earlier agreement. When the
Association did not accept these limitations the administration refused to
attend further bargaining sessions, claiming that there was "no useful
purpose in having the negotiating committees meet only to restate their
respective positions. '33
This, said the Faculty Association, was an unfair labour practice, and
the Labour Relations Board agreed. "The duty to bargain in good faith
obligates both parties to meet, to enter into full and frank discussion of
the issues that separate them, and to make every reasonable effort to
achieve a collective bargaining agreement. '34 The Board acknowledged
that this obligation is not unqualified; the parties may be excused from
meeting during a strike or lock-out, or, "if all they are doing is clearly
restating their respective positions, there is no hope of settlement, and
continued dialogue would serve no useful purpose."35 The University, it
said, might have justifiably concluded that agreement was impossible on
account of the 'pay for striking' issue.36 And in the Board's opinion the
University's frustration with the Faculty Association's approach to
bargaining was understandable. 37 But "no matter which party bears the
most responsibility for the problem, the only place a settlement can be
achieved will be at the bargaining table. '38 When the administration
presented in writing its best proposal for a restructured settlement on
October 26, it was obliged to give the Association an opportunity to
respond in face-to-face discussion. 39
31. Supra, note 11, atp. 5.
32. Supra, note 2, at p. 8.
33. A4d, at p.4.
34. kid
35. /bd, at p. 6.
36. -b, at p. 7.
37. bid, at p. 8.
38. Tbk
39. bid
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IV. Commentary
1. Pay for Striking
In the post-strike period the dispute between the University of
Saskatchewan and its Faculty Association was dominited by what the
Labour Relations Board called the 'pay for striking' issue. It was a major
impediment to achieving a collective agreement; it was the principal issue
in the grievance arbitration and in the first of the Labour Relations Board
cases described above. And it was an essential feature of the second. The
litigation on the issue represented important differences about the nature
of a university as a workplace, and will be of continuing interest in the
conduct of labour relations in the academy.
Consider, again, the positions of the parties. Immediately following the
vote on a question that implied room for alternatives (the ballot called for
strike action "up to and including" a full withdrawal of services), the
Faculty Association's executive called for a full strike. It did so on the
votes of 50.7 percent of those who cast ballots, or about 40 percent of the
University's faculty. In so doing, it divided the faculty, and those who
rejected the call to strike numbered at least as many as those who heeded
it.
Having called and sustained this strike for two weeks, the Faculty
Association was disturbed about the prospect of participants in the strike
losing two weeks pay and non-participants receiving their salaries upon
indicating to their deans that they had performed their assigned duties.
Added to this was the problem that the Association members had been
encouraged to believe that they would not lose salary for the period of the
strike. These members, and apparently the union leadership, had
concluded either that the University would not or could not deduct pay
or, if it did, would be forced to return it to participants in the strike at a
later date.
The administrators, on the other hand, knew that the faculty was
divided. They knew, too, that while some of the University's colleges had
been brought to a near standstill by the strike, others had been virtually
unaffected. They were not in a position to close the university and in
these circumstances would have been reluctant to do so even if they
could. Nor could they lawfully withhold pay from those who did not join
the strike.
But the administration was determined in its view that salary must be
deducted from striking members of the Faculty Association. Its position
was based on the obvious proposition that the tensicn that drives a strike
toward some kind of resolution is produced by an employer losing
employees and employees losing income. If this tension - in the form of
a no work, no pay policy - could not be produced in a strike that
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threatened the academic progress of students at the University of
Saskatchewan, then a labour relations model that tolerated strikes in that
setting would and should be questioned.
But how could salary be deducted from participants in the strike? The
concept of 'walking off thejob' in a university is a peculiar one compared
to strikes in a factory, the post office or even the school system. The
reason lies in the nature of a university. Academic endeavor is not easily
fixed in time or place. Classes and meetings may be scheduled, but study,
reading, grading and writing are not and cannot be. They are solitary
activities and cannot be constrained by timeclocks or monitored by
supervisors. In good universities, professors are accorded the latitude to
engage in them where and when they wish. The employment culture of
academia emphasizes the honour system - the personal commitment of
scholars to pursue scholarship. It can be no other way.
In this culture, the reality is that there is no work stoppage in the
conventional sense. Of course at the University pf Saskatchewan
regularly scheduled classes came nearly to an end in some colleges,
though several of these were scheduled off-campus or in professors'
homes. There was a picket line, but occasional duty on the line would not
deter all or even most from academic work in their homes, in other off-
campus locations, or because the University remained open, in their
offices, laboratories and libraries on campus.
What is a strike in this environment? And who were the participants
in it? These were fundamental questions and the different attempts by the
parties to answer them were at the root of the continuing dispute between
the University and the Faculty Association. The University's answer was
circumspect and sensible. It determined that salary should be withdrawn
from faculty members who had decided to take part in the strike. It
would do this by deducting pay from all members of the Faculty
Association except those who indicated that they had performed all of
their assigned duties. In short as the arbitrator in the Miller grievance put
it, "the employer was prepared to allow the honour system and the
conscience and integrity of the faculty member ' 40 to determine the pay
issue.
The Faculty Association's reply did not signal one of the finer
moments in the histories of either universities or trade unions. Its
executive had taken pride in the fact that it had been able to mobilize a
strike; indeed, it offered souvenirs of the event for sale to its members,41
40. Supra, note 3, at pp. 26, 27.
41. The souvenirs were offered for sale in Faculty Association Newsletter No. 113 (May,
1988).
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and one year later called for a birthday celebration in honour of it.42 But
it challenged the administration to prove that anyone had been a
participant. The failure to do so, it said, would mean that a no-work, no
pay policy could not be implemented and a loss of pay would not be
borne by anyone. The Association left no stone unturned in its quest,
even to the point of arguing that deductions could not be made in May
for a strike that occurred in March and April, when the postponement
had been arranged by the mediator pursuant to the Association's
request.43
It is surprising that the implications of taking this position did not deter
the Faculty Association from its course. Suppose that it had been
successful in pursuing its claim for salary to be paid to members who
have been on strike. What would have been the consequences? One that
naturally would have troubled ihe university as employer would have
been the clear message that faculty strikes do not entail financial loss.
This is a message that no employer could afford to give; it would have
compromised collective bargaining at the University of Saskatchewan for
years to come. More important, such a result would have encouraged
observers to conclude that this model of labour relations does not belong
in a university environment. The fundamental tension that makes a strike
the weapon of last resort in collective bargaining is the tension caused by
mutual loss - loss of employee service to the employer and loss of
income to workers. If this tension is not present a strike is no longer a
weapon of last resort, and should one occur, the urgency for the parties
to seek a compromise that will end it will be missing. The conclusion is
unavoidable. If the University could not withhold salary from striking
members of the Faculty Association, then strikes should not be tolerated
in that setting. It would not have taken long for those responsible for
public policy in the province to have so concluded.
It was possible to soften the impact of income loss in other ways.
Contract settlements after strikes frequently make provision for lump sum
payments which recognize that employees have lost money. But this is
not what the Faculty Association pursued. It sought to have members'
salaries for the strike period restored to them. Had it been successful, it
might have brought a legislated end to the availability of the strike as a
weapon in collective bargaining at the University of Saskatchewan.
What also was remarkable about the position of the Faculty
Association was the challenge it presented to the employment culture of
42. The birthday party was announced in published Faculty Association bulletins in March,
1989.
43. Supra, note 3, at pp. 27, 2 8.
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academia, to academic freedom. In taking the position that it was
incumbent on the University to prove that faculty members whose pay
was withheld were on strike, the Association was giving legitimacy to
employee supervision of a kind that is and should be an anethema to
scholars. In fact this was explicit. The Faculty Association's chief
negotiator and senior grievance officer gave evidence at the hearing of the
unfair labour charge brought by the University against the Association
with respect to the handling of the 306 grievances. He testified that deans
and other out-of-scope personnel, with the aksistance of administrative
staff who were members of the Canadian Union of Public Employees,
should have been in a position to monitor the activities of faculty so as
to identify who was and who was not -on strike.44 And the cross-
examination of deans by the Association's counsel in the same hearing
was directed in part to establishing the existence of a capacity to engage
in precisely this kind of supervision.45 In other words, in this view, the
University could and should have kept tabs on faculty members to
establish who was teaching, who was in his or her laboratory, the library,
or presumably any other place on campus where academic work might
be done. If the University could do so for the purpose of identifying
participants in the strike, Association leaders might have asked
themselves, who was to say it could not do so for other reasons?
This position threatened the employment culture of academia in other
ways. It suggested that the University could identify those who went on
strike by monitoring activities on campus whereas, of course, many
scholars go to work in basement studies in their homes or other
convenient places on or off university property. As well, it undermined
provisions of the collective agreement which stipulated that during a
strike employees shall not be denied access to university facilities by the
employer. If striking employees might be found on campus along with
non-striking ones, how was the employer supposed to distinguish
between them? It could not, of course, and it should not have to try, but
the Association's claim that deans and other out-of-scope personnel were
in a position to identify participants in the strike implied that it could
have and should have.
The seriousness with which the Faculty Association pursued the strike
pay issue was revealed in what might be termed its back-up position. If
it were held that the university was not required to prove participation in
the strike on the part of each grievor, it did not mean all salary for the
44. The evidence before the Labour Relations Board was summarized in notes prepared by an
administrative assistant who was present throughout the hearings.
45. Mhid
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period of the strike could be withheld from participants. The
Association's alternative claim, as summarized by the Labour Relations
Board was this: "if its members had done any part of their assigned duties
they should be paid for what they had done." 46 The union's chief
negotiator and senior grievance officer explained this in his evidence
before the Board. The Association's belief, he testified, was that if faculty
worked, they should be paid for the work -they performed. If they were
to lose money at all, it should be only for duties they failed to perform.47
In making this argument the Association was articulating the
understandable sentiments of many within its ranks. There had been no
work stoppage in the conventional sense. A strike was called, but what
this meant to a number of participants was an end to teaching and
committee work. If the strike had been prolonged by a week or two it
might have disrupted final examinations, but even this is speculative.
While there were members who felt that what was necessary was a full
withdrawal of services, others continued with many of their scholarly
activities. Naturally they felt some indignation when their full salaries for
the strike period were withdrawn - particularly when union leaders had
encouraged them in their belief that this would not be done.
And so the Faculty Association indicated its alternative course.
Grievors should be paid for the work they did. If they stopped teaching
or did not mark examinations, they could lose some money for that. But
they were entitled to be paid part salary if, for example, they continued
with their research, attended a scholarly conference, or consulted with
students off-campus or by telephone. Now this presents an obvious
problem of quantification: What portions of income are to be attributed
to different academic duties? Does teaching represent one-third or
perhaps forty percent of a professor's salary? The Faculty Association
struck quickly in March - not in May or July - and clearly aimed at
the academic progress of students, for it was here that it could bring to
bear the most pressure. Perhaps, therefore, teaching and related duties
should represent fifty percent of income.
The debate is absurd, of course, but it is a debate that was
contemplated, indeed invited, by the Faculty Association. What the
Association sought was unworkable, but that is not the only thing to be
said about it. Once again it revealed a stunning nalvet6 - if that is all it
was - about the conduct of collective bargaining and job action. The
suggestion that striking professors could pick and choose duties they
would perform, and for which they would be paid, is as much an implicit
46. Supra, note 1, at p. 6.
47. Supra note 43.
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rejection of the trade union model as was putting the University to the
proof that anyone had participated in job action. A faculty strike was just
a work reduction plan. From among the wide range of academic duties,
participants could continue to do the things they wanted to do and
receive some portion of their incomes for doing so. And if they stopped
teaching and thereby affected third parties (students) more than if they
stopped their research, well, that was their choice. An individually
tailored work reduction plan.
2. The Conduct of Bargaining
The 'pay for striking' matter was not the only question raised by the
labour dispute at the University of Saskatchewan. For some time there
had been little of the trust required to sustain a mature bargaining
relationship; after recent events there was none. This is not-unusual in the
wake of a protracted fight of this kind, and one normally would have
been content to indulge in the cliche that time heals all wounds and to
hope that it is true. However, certain patterns of conducting labour
relations have developed at the University of Saskatchewan which, if not
addressed, will continue to undermine collective bargaining in that
setting. If repeated, they would have the same potential elsewhere.
The first of these has to do with timing and the pace of negotiations.
They invariably got underway upon the expiry of an agreement and
continued for several months at a leisurely pace. In 1987, negotiations
began in June and continued at the rate of one meeting per month -
nine sessions in total over the months. preceding the rapid escalation to
job action. This was a somewhat genteel schedule: late start, infrequent
meetings and long adjournments during the summer months.
Unfortunately it did not suit the members of the Faculty Association as
well as it apparently suited the negotiators for both sides. They were
understandably annoyed by routinely late settlements and their
frustration with the repeating pattern in 1987-88 played a part in the
events of that year.
After the strike the same thing happened. There were nine meetings in
the six months between the rejection of the May/88 tentative agreement
and the end of negotiations in late October. In addition to the growing
reluctance of the two sides even to sit down together and talk, there was
by this time another factor. The administration had retained Winnipeg
labour consultant Harold Piercy to assist in reaching a contract, but
instead of serving as a consultant and advisor, he assumed the chair of the
administration's negotiating team. While Mr. Piercy was well qualified to
help bring order to talks that lacked civility and protocol, he was not in
a position to make himself available for the prolonged period of time that
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would have been needed to restore at least some continuity to
negotiations. His was a busy schedule and it could not be cleared for the
concentrated effort that was needed to salvage a negotiated end to the
dispute in Saskatoon.
The result of these factors - the timing and scheduling of contract
talks, and the late entry of Mr. Piercy in the chair of the administration's
team - was that there was no opportunity for generating the momentum
that is often the catalyst for settlement. It may have been that a negotiated
end for this fight was beyond the reach of the parties but, to put the
matter in modest terms, these things didn't help.
If a negotiated settlement was not possible, the single most important
reason was that as the dispute progressed, the issues that divided the
parties could not be identified, isolated and addressed by the negotiators
with a view to reaching agreement. The Faculty Association
Chairperson's remark that "It]here were as many reasons for being on the
picket line as there were picketers" 48 is a revealing one. It was a
concession that the dispute was unfocused and diffused, and that it was
a vehicle for the expression of a range of grievances and disappointments
that was limited only by the number of people involved.
Indeed this was an acknowledgement of what was at once the
Association's success and failure. Its strategy had been to exploit a wide
range of concerns and frustrations and it did so effectively. But in doing
so it conveyed to its membership and to the public the idea that its fight
with the administration was about issues which in fact were not on the
bargaining table and which could not properly be addressed through the
collective bargaining process. That politics of this kind can intrude upon
labour relations in any setting is not unusual. But experienced labour
leaders and negotiators know that they must keep their sights on the
bargaining table where a fixed agenda of contract issues must be
identified and addressed. If the task of reaching a settlement on these
issues is not the most important work to be done, collective bargaining
cannot work. In this dispute, reaching an employment contract was
secondary in importance to discrediting an unpopular administration,
and in the later stages of the fight, to securing payment for work
performed during the strike.
The Labour Relations Board commented upon the resistance of the
Faculty Association to narrowing the issues between the parties and
sympathized with the administration's claim that it was pursuing a
"receding horizon" of union demands.49 The Association's apparent
48. See Sutherland, supra, noteS, at p.14.
49. Supra, note 2, at p. 8.
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difficulty in defining its position reflected its approach to the dispute, and
in particular its unwillingness to recognize the limitations of the collective
bargaining process. Contract talks about the terms and conditions of
employment should not have imposed upon them the burden of all the
disappointments and frustrations of the participants and their
constituents; as well as mischievous claims that professors on strike
should not lose income. Either the Association did not understand this
fact, or was prepared to overlook it in order to further its political aims
in this dispute.
V. Epilogue
There were changes at the University of Saskatchewan in the months
following the mediation report that broke the deadlock between the
University and the Faculty Association. Disabled by serious illness, the
president who was the object of so much rancor retired one year before
the end of his term, and his successor has been prepared to address some
of the problems that contributed to the fight. He has recognized the
governance problems that have beset the institution in modem times, and
has committed himself to implementing many of the reform proposals
advanced in 1987 by the University's working group on governance.50
He also has undertaken administrative reorganization in the interest of
improving leadership effectiveness in what is one of the country's most
complex post-secondary institutions. 51
But there are some problems that cannot be addressed by a new
university administration alone. In the course of the labour dispute at the
University of Saskatchewan the employment culture of academia was
challenged - not by an intrusive and overbearing administration, but by
the union charged with representing faculty interests. There have not yet
been signs that most faculty recognize this side of the role played in their
name by the Faculty Association. Unless this happens, the process of
reform and renewal will remain incomplete.
50. Supr, note 5. But already there are disconcerting signs that efforts to reform the
university's governance apparatus may be frustrated. The Faculty Association has claimed that
change to the existing University Council must be bargained collectively between the
Association and the administration. On November 19, 1990, Faculty Association Chairperson
Professor Arne Paus-Jenssen wrote a letter on the subject of the president's proposal for a
representative university council and sent copies to all in-scope persohnel. Paus-Jenssen
reasoned that because the University Council is mentioned in the collective agreement, "the
university must bargain collectively with the Faculty Association" for any changes to the
Council. This proposition is wrong in law and unsound in policy, but its real danger is the
foreboding message it represents about the capacity of the institution to generate change and
reform within.
51. The University of Saskatchewan has 13 colleges including five in areas of medical science
(medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, nursing and veterinary medicine).
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VI. Conclusion
Even with the benefit of hindsight it is sometimes difficult to distinguish
between labour relations problems that are attributable to poor
bargaining, and difficulties whose roots lie deeper in features of structure
and organization. Certainly most of what happened in the course of the
conflict that has been described here was avoidable and can be laid at the
doorstep of the parties. But not all of it, for beneath events that can be
seen as episodic and passing there is one theme that will not go away. It
is the tension between a university culture that requires academic
freedom and collegiality, and a labour relations model that often features
both the substance and rhetoric of confrontation.
A vigorous academic culture will not for long co-exist with persistently
confrontational relationships within. North American industry has
suffered in global competition in part because of the adverse
consequences of a labour relations model founded on confrontation. So
too, North American universities will deteriorate if such a model acquires
and retains prominence in their affairs. And it is likely to do so wherever
the structure and organization of academic self-government is weak - as
at the University of Saskatchewan where the faculty association union
has displaced the university council as the organized voice of the
academic community.
In one way or another, both parties to the dispute at the University of
Saskatchewan acknowledged that this model of labour relations is not
easily accommodated in the culture of a university. The administration
did so when it did not attempt to rely upon hierarchical management in
determining who were, and who were not at work during the strike. It
was prepared instead to allow the honour system to determine the issue.
The faculty association's position was more ambiguous. It sanctioned a
regime of hierarchical management in its argument that the administra-
tion could have kept tabs on faculty members to determine who worked
and who didn't. However, its insistence that its members be paid for the
period of the strike, was an implicit rejection of the 'no work, no pay'
dictum which is central to industrial action in this model.
To the extent that they have adopted or imitated the labour relations
models of corporate North America, universities have neglected their role
as laboratories of innovation. Instead of seeking new means of conflict
resolution, they embraced the substance and rhetoric of confrontational
industrial relations just as its weaknesses were becoming apparent in the
emerging global economy. It was this development that was illustrated in
the dispute at the University of Saskatchewan. The quality of that
institution a generation from now will depend in part on the success of
its faculty and administration in achieving its modification or reversal.
